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ABSTRACT 
Although MPD patients typically present to treatment with affective 
symptoms, trauma-related information is originally encoded in the 
patients ' perceptions and mediated Uy their cognitions. This paper 
will describe the dysfunctional assumptive and perceptual categories 
that form the building blocks of MPD patients' distorted experiences. 
Perceptual shifting techniques and cognitive reJraming will conse-
quently be the recommended interventions prior to therapeutic abreac-
tive work. 
This paper will discuss how the division of consciousness 
as represented in multiple personality disorder (MPD) is an 
adaptation to trauma which, phenomenologically and char-
acteristically, is reflected in the ways in which MPD patients 
feel, think, and perceive. I propose that a dysfunctional 
perceptual organization underlies their often disjointed 
cognitions and affects and is, therefore, at the origin of their 
distorted perceptions of reality. I will first review some 
relevant features ofMPD, followed by a description ofMPD 
patients' affective and cognitive experiences. I will then 
postulate that some Gestalt perceptual organizing prin-
ciples subtend initially cognition and then affect, therefore 
suggesting that perceptual shifting techniques may facilitate 
the necessary therapeutic abreactive work. 
MPD is no longer understood as a rare condition more 
likely to be described in textbooks than to be found in one's 
practice (Kluft,1984). It represents one of the possible 
adaptations to trauma experienced by a child who is repeat-
edly abused. As a process, it is initiated by an immediate 
situation that confronts the child with an acute overwhelm-
ing threat (Freud, 1963; Spiegel, 1988) . That event propels 
the individual into a traumatic state that "theoretically" lasts 
the brief period of time needed for both the psychic equilib-
rium and the stimulus barrier to be reestablished 
(Furst,1978). In children who develop MPD, either because 
there is not enough time to equilibrate between abuse 
episodes or because the meaning the assault takes for the 
child is so unbearable, a pathological psychic equilibrium 
may emerge. Their initial reactions to trauma reflect the 
regression and helplessness that these children experience 
in the face of uncontrollable danger. Repeated exposure to 
similarly overwhelming life experiences deluges their over-
taxed psyches and forces them to rely on more regressive, 
primitive defenses such as the dissociative defenses. Though 
adaptive at its time of mobilization, dissociation does not 
allow the whole mind to master and work through the 
traumatic event in order to foster mastery and control by 
remembering, repeating, and reexperiencing it. Using dis-
sociation as a defense means that some parts of the mind may 
remember the trauma while other parts repeat it and still 
other parts may re-experience it. Dissociation actually serves 
the purpose of helping the child forget the event ever 
happened. It favors avoidance, inhibition, phobias (Pynoos 
& Eth,1985), anxiety, depression (Putnam et al.,1986) as 
well as revictimization (Kluft, 1989) . 
The effects of dissociation on the mind of the MPD 
patient could probably be best captured, at least heuristi-
cally, by Braun's (1988) BASK model of dissociation. Braun 
(1988) proposes that in nondissociators, events are experi-
enced and integrated simultanenusly over the four dimen-
sions represented in the acronym (BASK). Nondissociators 
have Knowledge of the events; they can associate Behaviors 
to those events, they have Sensations (physical/physiologi-
cal/ proprioceptive) during them and feel Affects as well. On 
the other hand, an MPD patient can disconnect any or all 
dimensions of the events; she can allow the event/ parts to 
remain dissassociated or recombine them through autohyp-
nosis in a way which may be congruent with dysfunctional 
patterns of feeling, believing, and behaving. By the time the 
MPD patient reaches adulthood, her dissociative abilities are 
out of her control and often maladaptive. 
AFFECT IN MPD 
MPD patients' identifYing complaints are often pre-
sented to the therapist in terms of feelings and moods -and 
as such can be suggestive of any number of affective disor-
ders. MPD patien ts speak of feeling depressed, feeling angry 
for reasons that they do not understand, feeling out of 
control, or even insisting, "I don't know how I feel. " 
Problems with mood are central in MPD patients al-
though their affective presentation may be remarkably 
nonspecific. Many MPD patients present suffering from 
mood swings (Putnam,1986). Franklin (1988) notes that 
multiple mood swings within one therapy session should 
alert the therapist to the presence of dissociation. Primary 
affective disorder can be an epiphenomenon of MPD 
(Coryell,1983). Bliss (1980) reviews the presenting symp-
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toms of 14 patients with MPD. Though these symptoms are 
experienced across many dimensions, they often revolve 
around problems in mood and affect. Bliss (1980) docu-
mented a history of depression in 100% of his MPD patients, 
hypomania in 71 % and suicide attempts in 91 %. Putnam et 
al. (1986) reported depression in 88%, suicide attempts in 
61 % and mood swings in 70% of their 100 MPD patients. In-
somnia, panic attacks, and phobias were also quite common 
in their sample. 
Acute emotional reactions are often triggered in MPD 
patients by situations/people/ places that, through stimulus 
generalization, have become associated with their abusers. A 
strong affective component is present in MPD in which 
depression and anxiety, often expressed as despair and 
panic attacks respectively, are the norm. The MPD patient, 
like many victims of abuse, seems to have a spontaneous 
affective response to certain stimuli. These responses appear 
to be conditioned emotional responses (CER) which involve 
more than temporal con tigui ty between a condi tioned stimu-
lus (CS) (i.e., abuser) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) . 
The work of Rescorla (1972), and Rescorla and Wagner 
(1972) suggests that in order for the CS to become condi-
tionned, the CS must impart reliable information about the 
occurrence of the US. When conditioning occurs, this means 
the outcome the subject anticipates and the CS are contigu-
ous and the association between the two is fairly predictable. 
Many MPD patients typically report that as children they 
expended much energy in "figuring out" what it is they 
either did or said which lead to the abuse; this was an attempt 
on their part to understand their alleged contribution to the 
onset of the violence and to eventually thwart it. Therefore, 
much of the information about the stimulus circumstance 
has been repeatedly processed at a cognitive level. 
COGNmON AND MPD 
The MPD patient's cognitive make up is a defensive by-
product of the abuse sustained as a child. Contrary to the 
initial trauma starting in adulthood, (i.e., for some Vietnam 
Veterans) , the average age of abuse onset for the MPD 
patient is 4.5 years (Schultz et al.,1987). At that young age, 
a child is still progressing through the anticipated Piagetian 
developmental stages; her cognitive structures are coalesc-
ing and evolving in a terroristic environment in which she 
feels held hostage and isolated from peers. The rules that 
abused children learn and carry with them into adolescence 
and adulthood are remarkably unhelpful in a nonabuse en-
vironment. What they believe to be real and unreal and true 
and untrue are often distortions by normative standards. 
Nonetheless, these cognitive distortions form the basis of 
MPD patients' assumptive world and the grounds upon 
which they formulate opinions and make decisions. 
DETERMINANTS OF THOUGHT IN MPD 
The distortions that form the basis of the MPD patients' 
cognitive realities stem from faulty information processing 
of the varieties described by Beck et al. (1979) . They lead to 
the following pathological determinants of thought: 
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I) dichotomous thinking, 2) selective abstraction, 3) arbi-
trary inference, 4) overgeneralization, 5) catastrophizing, 6) 
time distortion, 7) excessive responsibility, 8) circular think-
ing and 9) mis-assuming causality. Each determinant of 
thought will be briefly reviewed here in one case example 
that has been developed more fully elsewhere (Fine, 1989). 
Case History. The patient, Elayne, is nearly 30 years old. 
Her MPD was diagnosed four years ago. She had spent the 
previous six years in a supportive therapy with the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia, receiving ongoing pharmacotherapy with 
major tranquilizers. One 'of the driving forces and major 
distortions of the Elayne'S host personality is an attempt to 
maintain an idealized view of her father, the abuser. In 
reality, I have learned that this abusive father started fon-
dling his daughter before the age of one. By her second 
birthday, there was vaginal finger penetration. Oral and anal 
intercourse were ritualized by age four, culminating in daily 
sexual intercourse by age five. Later, to humiliate her fur-
ther, he included her brother and the family dog. Concomi-
tant physical abuse led to a fractured skull on two occasions. 
1. Dichotomous thinking (all or none thinking) is a re-
sponse set in which there is a tendency to classify experiences 
into one of two extreme categories. Depending on the per-
sonality that is being addressed, the thinking may be polar-
ized from the positive extreme to the negative. 
The host personality errs in an unrealistically positive 
description of her father. He is described as a tall, hand-
some, brilliant professional man. An increasing number of 
superlatives are employed as the portrayal continues. The 
host personality's belief system about the father is a distor-
tion . . . and even sounds delusional considering the realities 
of her life at home. It is as if her distorted idealization of the 
father is directly proportionate to the degree of his intense 
devaluation of her. 
This example of all or none thinking is only one of the 
possible determinants of thought encapsulated within the 
psychological structures of one personality of an MPD pa-
tient; other distorted cognitions can be found within that 
same personality, the theme of the distortion being congru-
ent with the function that personality serves within the 
system of personalities. 
2. Selective Abstraction represents a response set in which 
certain elements or charactersitics of an event are taken out 
of context. Some salient features do not seem to be inte-
grated into the event's perception and therefore can distort 
its meaning. 
One of Elayne's angry adolescent alters refused to inter-
act with a more passive depressed alter who would just "lie 
there" when the father abused them: "I don't gotta speak to 
no pushovers." When examining the abuse scene, this angry 
alter did not perceive the threatening scalpel in the father's 
hand. The passive alter's stillness, even though it did not 
prevent the initiation of the abuse, certainly restricted its' 
extent. 
3. Arbitrary lnference is a response set that involves the 
drawing of specific conclusions without having the evidence 
to support them. 
The host personality that struggled so hard to maintain 
an idealized view of the father had no data to substan tiate her 
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claims other than perhaps a few pictures of the father, some 
clippings about his professional accomplishments, and his 
diplomas on which to ground her laudatory statements. She 
had very few accessible recollections of the father around the 
house. 
4. Overgeneralization and Under generalization. Overgener-
alization is a response set in which incorrect conclusions are 
drawn from a restricted sample or from nonexistant data. 
One angry adolescent alter adheres to a syllogism which 
generalizes her experiences from one man to all men: "My 
father is bad - he is a man - I cannot trust him therefore I can 
trust no man ." She has chosen to exclude 50% of the 
population from her interactional repertoire and has been 
involved in a long series of unsuccessful lesbian relation-
ships. 
Undergeneralization is a response setin which incorrect 
conclusions are drawn because stimulus elements which are 
by normative standards grouped together are not under-
stood by the MPD patient as belonging to the same stimulus 
category. 
A prostitute alter who was attempting to shift her func-
tion within the personality system was having great difficulty 
understanding my request for discontinuing anonymous 
"pick up on the street corner or in a bar" sex. After she 
understood that pick up in a doorway, car, subway (etc.) fell 
into the identical category, we had to clarify that "blow jobs" 
though not ending with the letter X in her vocabulary, did in 
mIne. 
5. Catastrophizing and decatastrophizing. Catastrophizing 
is a response set where normal stimuli or events are per-
ceived as disasters and elicit extreme evasive responses. 
One of Elayne's teenage personalities who used to be 
forcibly administered diazepam pills by the father before he 
would rape her, fled from a reputable urban restaurant by 
climbing out the ground floor window when a woman at an 
adjoining table took out a pill box. 
Decatastrophizing is a response set in which alarming 
stimuli are misread and down played rather than receiving 
the appropriate attention and deserved response. 
A child alter in Elayne took a serious fall which abraded 
her skin. A staphylococcal infection ensued. The symptoms 
were ignored until they become so severe as to warrant 
immediate admission to an intensive care unit with prompt 
administration of intravenous antibiotics. The children who 
were afraid of worse pain and doctors (the father was a 
physician) colluded with one another to obscure the hand 
(which by this time was the size of a boxing mitt) from the 
adult alters who would have addressed the problem immedi-
ately. 
6. Time distmtion is a reponse set in which an individual 
thinks that she is in a differen t year / season/ mon th/ day and 
feels and acts accordingly. 
One alter who was still struggling with the diagnosis of 
MPD preferred a geoclimatic explanation for her wearing a 
bulky winter sweater to our July appointment; her last memory 
was of seeing the Red Apple descending on Times Square on 
New Year's Eve. 
7. Excessive Responsibility and Excessive Irresponsibility. 
Excessive responsibility is a response set which typically leads 
to excessive reactions to opportunities for self flagellation, 
self blame and guilt. 
A child personality may persistently berate herself for 
"not having been a good enough little girl" or an adult alter 
may be unable to forgive herself her continued sexual 
involvment with the father through adolescence or adult-
hood. 
Excessive irresponsibility is the converse of excessive 
responsibility. It often leads adolescent and/ or angry alters 
to behave in ways which perpetuate abuse. 
An aforementionned adolescent alter would prostitute 
herself to "make men pay," ignoring the public health and 
personal risks in this practice. 
8. Circular Thinking is a response set in which the pre-
mise for the conclusion becomes the conclusion and the 
conclusion can become the premise, and so on. 
One of the child alters commonly repeats: "I am bad, 
then I am hurt. I am hurt because I am very bad." 
9. Mis-assuminq Causality is a response set in which 
precursor incidents are disconnected from their conse-
quences and unfortunate connections are presumed be-
tween unrelated events. 
Because one of Elaynes's male personalities found him-
selfin my waiting room one day (a child alter had fled there 
during a particularly difficult flashback) he assumed it was 
his appointment time and began to get tempestuous as he 
argued with another MPD patient. In reality, it was both the 
wrong time and the wrong day for his appointment. 
How MPD patients develop these thought determinants 
remains unclear, but has been speculated upon elsewhere 
(Fine,1989). One must suspect that these cognitions, though 
trauma based, have evolved because they were adaptive, 
reinforced, or both. One might speculate that, in MPD 
patients as in non-MPD patients, the thought determinants 
originate from perceptions derived from the stimulus envi-
ronment of the developing child who is trying to make sense 
of her world. 
PERCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION AND MPD 
The human brain is systematic and selective in the way 
in which it organizes the information it receives into Gestal-
ten (McMullin,1986). In this section, I postulate that the 
perceptual rules which govern the non-MPD individual may 
also be used among the various personalities of the MPD 
patient, with greater or lesser success. Each personality will 
scan all inputs, looking for impressions that seem compat-
ible with those already held, excluding those that are not 
compatible, and weaving all the accepted inputs into a con-
sistent pattern of thought (McMullin,1986). Each personal-
ity creates a consistent, coherent background, which be-
comes that personality's reality. Each though t must fit neatly 
within the pattern, and even if the pattern is illogical, it may 
be valid for that personality as are the associated emotions. 
In non-MPD individuals, these Gestalten are modified by 
learning and experience as the child successfully negotiates 
the various developmental stages. Unlike normal children, 
MPD children rely on rudimentary impressions. Their dis-
torted impressions remain unchallenged and fixed, rather 
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than evolving in flexible and situation congruent ways. Their 
functioning reflects their nonexperimental approach to life. 
They often think according to trance logic rather than caus-
ally. 
All aspects of MPD patients' perceptual/conceptual 
organization may not be equally affected by the traumas they 
experienced as children. The cognitive distortions and the 
perceptual dysfunctions are particularly pervasive around 
perceptions of self, self-other interaction, and other-other 
interaction. If these deep rooted perceptions were operative 
in all spheres ofMPD patients' lives, the diagnosis would be 
far easier to make, because their judgement would be con-
sistently poor throughout all aspects of their life. 
Precisely how the brain creates these often-damaging 
patterns is not fully understood, but German Gestalt psy-
chologists collected a series of predictable perceptual proc-
esses that have withstood the test of time and experimenta-
tion. Although their work is often limited to examining the 
stimulus elements that lead to a person's perceptual organi-
zation, these results can be readily applied to the concepts 
presented here. These concepts are the following: Proxim-
ity, Pragnanz, Similarity, Organizational Set, Direction, 
Absorption, Resistance, and Stability. A brief review of these 
perceptual/ conceptual organizing principles (McMullin, 
1986) will be considered in our case example. 
1. Proximity. In proximity, elements close together in 
time or space are associated. One of Elayne's child person-
alities believed that having her shoes untied led to sexual 
abuse; as therapy progressed, she came to understand that 
just being in the house meant that she would be molested 
and that the untied shoe laces were just incidentals. 
2. Pragnanz. In Pragnanz, gaps and omissions are ig-
nored so that the fit is stable and closed. This means that if 
Pragnanz is operative, some personalities should ignore 
contradictory elements in their irrational beliefs. Elayne's 
host personality maintained an idealized view of her abuser I 
father. In the beginning of treatment, she actually had no 
knowledge of the abuse, although cues were there that she 
chose to ignore. Her perception of her father as a benevo-
lent individual was so established that even when evidence to 
the con trary flooded her consciousness as the arduous work 
of treatment continued, the host rejected the findings. 
3. Similarity. Similar percepts are grouped together. The 
angry adolescent alter who used to prostitute herself wanted 
to make all men "pay." She put all men in the same category 
without discrimination or, perhaps better said, with equal 
discrimination. 
4. Organizational Set. Once the brain forms a percept, it 
continues organizing incoming data in the same way even 
though the stimulus pattern changes. The previous example 
suggests that the angry adolescent alter had one representa-
tion of how men were. All men would be lumped into the 
category MAN regardless of their individual characteristics. 
5. Direction. This Gestalt principle suggests that today's 
perceptions are determined by yesterday's perceptions. In 
MPD (probably more than in any other diagnostic category) 
this holds true to the point at which some personalities actu-
ally maintain the age at which the initial information was 
encoded. Elayne had a predominance of child alters who 
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analyzed the world according to age-congruent beliefs and 
rules. 
6. Absorption. Stronger perceptsl concepts will absorb 
weaker ones. The MPD patient may give up an established 
belief if a more potent, simpler and more congruent expla-
nation can be presented. Elayne's host personality more 
readily accepted the diagnosis of MPD when it explained 
most of what ailed her rather than her having to rely on a 
combination medical/psychological diagnosis which was 
incongruent with her level offunctionning (i.e., schizophre-
nia with epileptic seizures/black-outs/substance abuse and 
multiple somatic problems with a RI O of Malingering) and 
led her to be heavily medicated. 
7. Resistance and Stability. Strong organizational forms 
resist desintegration. In Elayne, like in other MPD patients, 
itwas important for the information surrounding the trauma 
to be absorbed and imprinted immediately and accurately, 
so that when the child was re-abused, she would have access 
to an already established protective system. These connec-
tions are often well rehearsed and overlearned. 
At the beginning of treatmen t for MPD, most of Elayne' s 
personalities were unwilling to even contemplate any shifts 
in their diagnosis: "Speaking of Johnny come latelys -- I have 
had many crazy labels ... this is the best one yet-you did not 
go to school for this one did you? Do you sell snake oil on the 
side, too? " 
Even though her beliefs and perceptions were terribly 
dysfunctional, handicapped her, and fostered revictimiza-
tion as an adult, they were familiar and established; as Elayne 
presently says with cynicism: "This MUST be crazy, it feels 
like HOME! " It remains to be explored whether there is a 
one to one relationship between one perceptual concept 
and one determinant of thought. Indeed, like above, several 
conceptual Gestalten may feed one determinant of though t. 
Therefore, to modify one cognition and/ or challenge one 
false belief the therapist may need to help the patient modify 
several Gestalten. 
TREATMENT IMPUCATIONS 
The treatment implications are fairly clear if it is under-
stood that the goals of therapy for MPD patients involve 
favoring integration between the personalities by fostering a 
congruence of purpose and motivation between them 
(Kluft, 1985). The ways in which this congruence is attained 
is by having the different personalities "talk and feel" with 
one another as well as communicate with the therapist. 
Interpersonality communication will facilitate the recon-
necting of the four dimensions of the previously described 
BASK model-reconnections necessary to achieve both 
completeness and continuity of experience. For the MPD 
patient to reclaim all aspects of her life, it is imperative that 
she accept all affects linked to her past and her present. The 
reuniting of affect to the other three dimensions of the 
BASK model involves abreactive work which needs to be 
prepared for both cognitively and perceptually. Abreaction 
without an a priori cognitive restructuring can be perceived 
by the patient as retraumatizing; it can foster further avoid-
ance of affect. 
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Only therapists naive to the treatment of dissociative 
disorders believe that abreactions are new to the MPD 
patient. Patients know about abreactions before starting 
therapy, though they probably do not call them by name. 
Abreactive experiences are often described by the patient in 
the course of the evaluation process as follows: 
"I don't know what happened, I just freaked out." 
"I lost it." 
"I went crazy." 
Without the therapist's help the patient is perfectly 
capable of reconnecting a dysfunctional trauma-based per-
ceptual structure to feelings. Cognitions are incidentals. But 
she has learned nothing from the abreactions other than to 
attempt to avoid them next time. Our role as therapists is to 
help the patient have a corrective abreactive experience. 
The therapist favors the reconnecting of affect to a non-
trauma based (less trauma based) perceptual structure 
through the intermediary of nondistorted (less distorted) 
cognitive determinan ts. This cognitive restructuring involves 
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